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Clark Butler 
The Mind-Body Problem: A Nonmaterialistic Identity Thesis 
At least two quite distinct problems appear to have been confused under the label “mind-body 
problem.” The first is posed by the alleged fact of mind-body interaction, while the second arises 
from the purported fact of mind-body parallelism. And the issues are as different as are the 
senses of “mind” and “body” which they involve.  
Interaction. Historically, the mind-body puzzle is part of our Cartesian legacy. It seems not to 
have arisen in the form we know it during the previous history of Western thought. It is probably 
because the Greeks had no prevailing conception of a de-spiritualized material world. Although 
the origins of this conception can be traced at least to Democritus, the view was not 
“enculturated” until the rise of the “new physics.” In the prevailing Aristotelian view, the 
material world was not exclusively material, since it was animated by final causes. But when this 
world came to be viewed as nothing but matter in motion, reflective persons were faced with an 
apparent difficulty. For if, as morality, theology, and common sense all seemed to agree, a 
person is not merely a physiological machine in the material world of natural science, that is, if a 
man has a mind as well as a body, and if, through volition, this mind sometimes acts on his body 
(and vice versa), the question then arises: how is such interaction possible? As Descartes 
formulated it, the mind-body problem became, above all, the problem of interaction.  
Interaction thus became a problem only with the emergence of the “modern” world view, which 
set up a sharp opposition between the physical and the mental. The physical world was 
conceived as a closed system in which the amount of energy remained constant, and in which 
motions occurred according to regular laws undisturbed by any extra-physical influences. When 
it is further assumed that the human body, which each of us (barring paralysis) experiences to 
move on the exercise of volition, is a part of the physical world, the difficulty arises as to how 
interaction is empirically possible (i.e., how it is possible without violation of natural laws). 
Motor volition seems to imply violation of the principle of the conservation of energy, as well as 
the deterministic principle according 
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to which physical states have adequate physical antecedents. Every time one moves his finger, it 
seems that the total amount of energy in the world is increased. Moreover, there seems to be an 
inherent difficulty in conceiving how something material, such as a limb, can be suddenly set in 
motion other than by being touched by something else. But how can something nonmaterial, 
such as a mind, “touch” a body?  
Many such difficulties may be ill-founded. But it is undeniable that they have exercised more 
than a few able minds in recent centuries. From the present historical standpoint, however, it 
appears that difficulties of this nature have been largely dissipated by the distinction between the 
physiological organism and the lived body established by phenomenologists such as Sartre1 and 
Merleau-Ponty,2 and by Gestalt psychologists such as Kohler.3 From this perspective, the 
problem of interaction arises from confusing the lived body with the organism. The lived body is 
not in the world of natural science. It is rather a content of one’s “field of consciousness.” (We 
shall return to this concept later. It may suffice now to say that the conscious field contains all 
objects which one directly experiences, and excludes all those whose existence is known—in the 
“weak” sense of “knowledge”—indirectly and by inference.)  
The distinction between the lived body and the organism is just as inescapable as the distinction 
frequently made between the perceived star and the astronomer’s star. Because photons require 
time to traverse space, the astronomer’s star may no longer exist when the perceived star exists 
in an earthly field of consciousness. Also, the perceived star has sense properties (Locke’s 
secondary ideas) such as visual brightness, whereas the astronomer’s star, which is known only 
indirectly and by (nondeductive) inference from what is perceived, has no sense qualities, being 
invisible matter in motion. If there had been no sentient minds, there never would have been any 
perceived stars, but there still could have been astronomical stars.  
Now if we distinguish in this way between perceived and astronomical stars, so must we 
distinguish between the lived body and the physiological organism. My physiological hand is 
known only indirectly and by inference; it is postulated as the normal primary external cause 
(external to my retina) of my perceived hand. The physiological hand is invisible. It is 
 
― 231 ― 
analyzable into elementary physical particles, while my lived hand breaks down upon analysis 
into “sense data,” patches of skin-colored surface. The physiological hand reflects photons to the 
retina, and the stimulation of the retina is followed by a sequence of neural events eventuating in 
excitation of the occipital lobe. Concurrent with this activity in the occipital lobe, a perceived 
hand appears in my field of consciousness. And just as the astronomical star might no longer 
exist when the perceived star exists, so at least in principle the physiological hand might no 
longer exist when the perceived hand exists. Certainly the distance is shorter from the 
physiological hand to the retina than from the astronomical star to the retina, but the principle is 
the same. Certainly there is no likelihood that when I see my hand my physiological hand no 
longer exists, but the theoretical possibility is there, and that is all that is necessary to set up a 
sharp distinction between the perceived body and the organism. If one thing can exist while the 
other does not exist, they must be different things. And, quite apart from the argument based on 
the time-lapse required for photons to cross space, the phenomenon of the phantom limb is 
sufficient to establish the distinction.  
Once the above distinction is made, any directly experienced mind-body interaction involving 
volition is seen to occur between two contents of successive fields of consciousness: between the 
lived body and the active, volitional center of consciousness. Since the lived body is not in the 
material world of natural science, volition suggests no suspension of the law of the conservation 
of energy in the material universe. Moreover, since the lived body is not “material” in the 
required sense, its responsiveness to the causal efficacy of volitional acts raises no problem of 
how interaction is possible between different types of substance. Finally, the distinction obviates 
the need for any restrictions on the explanation by natural science of natural events. The 
movement of one’s physiological hand may have a material cause even though the movement of 
one’s perceived hand is partially caused by a volitional act which is in some sense mental.  
There is a sense of the term “mind” in which the volitional act and the lived body are both 
“mental”: they are both contents of the “field of consciousness.” It is this sense of “mind” that 
Berkeley invokes when he insists that all the furniture of the earth is in the mind. If we hold on to 
this sense of the term, there is no special problem of interaction, at least none in the sense in 
which Descartes is said to have given us such a problem. In his system, the mind-body problem 
was the logically insuperable 
 
― 232 ― 
(but morally compelling) problem of bringing mind by the back door into a physical world 
which, in the first place, had been defined as mindless. But as we now conceive it, the fact of 
volition implies no such difficulty. What remains is an interesting but not insoluble problem of 
phenomenological analysis. It is the job of describing with accuracy the ways in which the lived 
body and the active center of consciousness are experienced to interact. We want to describe, for 
example, how the body secures the insertion of consciousness in a world, how it enters into one’s 
self-image, or how it sometimes resists volition, as in states of illness or drowsiness. Finally, we 
want to pay attention to coenesthetic as well as external perception. Such descriptions have been 
fruitfully initiated by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  
Parallelism. It might be supposed that the mind-body problem has finally been slain in its 
metaphysical form. In fact, however, it seems that the above dissolution of the problem of 
interaction serves only to throw into relief a second problem which has sometimes been confused 
with the interaction difficulty under the label “mind-body problem.” The second problem cannot 
be reduced to one of phenomenological analysis. It is speculative rather than descriptive. In a 
word, it is the problem of parallelism. And it arises in the following way.  
We have already mentioned that, according to the natural science explanation, the directly 
perceived star is concurrent with neural activity in the occipital lobe. This concurrence illustrates 
psycho-physical parallelism. Parallelism is the postulate according to which there is a one-to-one 
correspondence of states of a person’s field of consciousness to brain states. The postulate 
implies that two qualitatively different states of a person’s field of consciousness do not 
accompany the qualitatively same state of his brain, and that two different brain states are never 
accompanied by the same state of the field of consciousness. Parallelism does not assert that all 
brain states are accompanied by states of the mental field, for that would obviously be false. 
What it does assert is that when brain states are accompanied by states of the mental field, to 
every qualitative difference in the mental state there corresponds such a difference in the brain 
state, and conversely.  
By saying that psycho-physical parallelism is a “postulate,” it is meant that, although it cannot be 
logically or empirically proven, it is a fruitful working hypothesis in psycho-physical research, 
supported by available empirical evidence in physiological psychology. The correlations 
tentatively established by physiological psychologists provide some evidence 
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for parallelism, which thus may be understood as an empirical hypothesis. It is the sort of 
hypothesis for which not only confirmatory but also disconfirmatory evidence seems possible. 
No doubt a parallelist might invent epicyclical complications in order to retain his hypothesis in 
the face of growing counter evidence, but if after long and careful observation under ideal 
conditions (e.g., Feigl’s auto-cerebroscope4 ) one failed to discover any changes in the brain state 
associated with changes in the mental state, there would arrive a point where one would have to 
be an unscientifically dogmatic parallelist not to abandon one’s hypothesis.  
Nothing yet has been said regarding the problem of parallelism. If we tentatively accept 
parallelism as true on the basis of available empirical evidence, the question immediately arises: 
why does the mental series run parallel with a brain series? Assuming a correspondence of the 
type explained above, why does it occur? Until we find some explanation for parallelism, we 
seem to have an incredible accident on our hands. As here understood, parallelism is not one of 
the alternative “solutions” to the mind-body problem. On the contrary, it poses the problem in a 
very acute form.  
The not infrequent confusion of the parallelistic difficulty with that of interaction is indicated by 
the fact that epiphenomenalism and the double-aspect theory are often presented as alternative 
“solutions” to the Cartesian problem of interaction.5 But in fact it is to the problem of parallelism 
that these two doctrines appear as solutions, however inadequate. Both doctrines deny that 
interaction in the troublesome Cartesian sense occurs. They are “solutions” only in the sense that 
materialism, which denies the mental series, is a solution to the problem of parallelism. This is 
the sense of the term in which a problem’s dissolution can be its “solution.”  
There are different ways in which the mind-body relation posed by interaction can be 
distinguished from the one posed by parallelism. For one thing, interaction, unlike parallelism, is 
a relation of alternate action of two terms each on the other. It is not a relation of concurrent 
mental and physiological events. But the easiest way to distinguish the two relations is to 
distinguish the different senses of “mind” and “body” which are invoked. 
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We have already distinguished two senses of “body”: the lived body and the physiological 
organism. It is with the latter sense that parallelism is concerned. However, “mind” is even more 
ambiguous than “body.” At least three meanings may be distinguished: (1) the active, volitional 
center of consciousness, (2) the total field of consciousness, and (3) the self. The first sense is 
used when it is said that perceiving a chair is mental, but that the chair directly perceived is not 
mental. The second sense, as already noted, is suggested when Berkeley says that the entire 
physical universe exists in a mind. Clearly, the universe does not exist in an act of consciousness. 
The third sense seems to be used when it is said that the mind is immortal, since both an act of 
consciousness and a field of consciousness appear to be momentary. In the present context, we 
are primarily concerned with the first and second senses of “mind.” The mind-body interaction 
discussed above occurs between volitional activity and the lived body. (It will be suggested later 
that there is a second relation of mind-body interaction, occurring between the field of 
consciousness and the remainder of the physiological organism. But this interaction poses no 
special difficulty. In the context of a panpsychist hypothesis, it will be seen as either mind-mind 
or body-body, rather than as mind-body, interaction. It appears problematic only as does 
interaction between concrete elements.) Parallelism, on the other hand, concerns the relation 
between mind as the total field of consciousness and body as brain process. We thus see that 
experienced volition and parallelism give us two completely different relations. The entire 
relation of interaction between the active center of consciousness and the lived body is internal to 
the mental term of the parallelistic relation.  
Before turning to the problem of parallelism, we shall attempt to clarify the concept of a field of 
consciousness. (The following comments are necessarily restricted. Most significantly, we shall 
make no attempt in this paper to relate the field of consciousness, conceived as a momentary 
event, with the self conceived as an enduring subject of actions, rights and obligations.) One’s 
present field of consciousness contains everything of which there is direct awareness, plus the 
awareness of all this. What it means to be directly aware is perhaps best clarified by examples. 
The reader is directly aware of the side of the sheet which he is reading, but he is presumably 
only indirectly aware of the other side of the same sheet. He is directly aware of certain present 
events, but is only indirectly aware of actual events which occurred ten minutes ago or which 
will occur ten minutes hence. (Images of the past or future are not actually past or 
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future.) He is directly aware of his own feelings, but is not aware in this way of anyone else’s 
feelings (at least excluding considerations of ESP). There are many things which might be said 
about a field of consciousness. For example, one might engage in phenomenological analysis of 
the act-object structure. However, we shall limit ourselves to a series of points which seem to 
bear directly upon the solution of the parallelistic problem.  
(1) A field of consciousness is not internally related to anything else.6 In other words, we can 
logically (i.e., without self-contradiction) assert it to exist unchanged even if we suppose that 
everything not contained within it does not exist. This point is already admitted by those who 
claim that solipsism is logically consistent, and that it is not possible to deduce the existence of 
separate substantial entities (whether matter, other minds or God) from the existence of one’s 
field of consciousness. Let us suppose that a field of consciousness is not essentially 
independent. Then it is internally related to something not contained within it. But since to be 
aware of an entity is to be aware, at least tacitly, of all things to which the first is internally 
related (e.g., one cannot be aware of a left-hand dot as such without also being aware of a right-
hand dot), the supposition breaks down and becomes self-contradictory: all things internally 
related to a content of one’s field would equally have to be contents of his field.  
(2) A field of consciousness is not a collection of externally related elements, but is rather an 
organic whole of internally related aspects.7 The argument for this thesis would depend on 
showing that all individual objects (whether perceptual or imaginary) in a field are internally 
related to one another, and secondly that they are all internally related to an act of consciousness 
also contained in the field. For example, suppose one perceives a storefront. This is more than 
merely having a sense impression of a storefront. One cannot perceive a storefront unless, 
besides directly sensing a storefront, one imagines a correlative storerear. It is this that explains, 
in the course of a first visit to a movie village, one’s surprise at discovering that there is no 
storerear. The sensed front and imagined rear are two internally related aspects of the thing 
perceived. In general, every 
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object within the perceptual-imaginary field appears to be essentially conditioned by the context 
consisting of all other such objects in the field. Every individual object of focal awareness is 
essentially dependent on the entire marginal horizon of awareness. This dependence has been 
made the subject of close study by the Gestalt psychologists.8  
The entire perceptual-imaginary domain is in turn essentially dependent on an act of perceptual-
imaginative awareness. To perceive is not merely to receive sensations passively. It is also to 
judge. Because perception is active as well as passive, the thing perceived is essentially relative 
to the perceiving of it. For example, no one who entered for the first time a modern Western 
environment would be able to perceive a typewriter, since due to his lack of previous experience 
he would be incapable of responding to sensation with the same interpretative judgments of 
which the rest of us are capable. He could only perceive a thingamajig.  
(3) A field of consciousness is individual (rather than universal). This point by itself is trivial 
compared to the first two. The reason for making it is that, in conjunction with the first two 
points, it permits the conclusion that a field of consciousness is a substantial entity, where 
“substantial entity” means an essentially independent and indivisible (i.e., noncollective) 
individual. This concept of substance is related to Aristotle’s concept of an ultimate subject of 
predication (exemplification) which is not “present in” (essentially dependent upon?) anything 
apart from itself.9 A main difference is that Aristotle allowed that the parts of a substance (e.g., a 
hand) could themselves be substances.10 Thus an Aristotelian substance is not necessarily 
indivisible. On the issue of indivisibility, the present conception is closer to that of the atomists, 
and to the Leibnizian notion of a monad.11 They denied substantial change in nature, but they at 
least agreed with Aristotle in viewing a substance as a continuing subject of accidental change. 
However, if, with Leibniz and the atomists, we introduce indivisibility as an essential condition 
of substantiality, then we deprive ourselves of any right to regard a substance as a subject of 
change. This is the point which I should like to stress at present.  
Change presupposes the reality of time, of temporal succession. This means that there can be no 
(temporally) indivisible subject of change. 
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Events in time are externally related to one another, since if they were internally related they 
would be simultaneous rather than successive. One thing is internally related to another only if it 
is what it is through the other, so that when the other does not exist it cannot itself exist. Now if a 
substance, in the sense of an essentially independent, indivisible individual, were a subject of 
change, it would consist in a series of externally related, successive events, and thus would fail to 
be indivisible. The indivisibility criterion implies that a substance cannot be a collection of 
simultaneously existing substances. But it is equally implied that it cannot be a collection of 
successive substantial entities.  
If a field of consciousness is a substantial entity, then on the view under consideration it would 
not endure through time as a subject of change. Two possibilities seem to arise. Either a person’s 
mental life is exhausted by a single indivisible field of consciousness, or it consists in many such 
momentary fields in succession. In the former case, the experience of temporal succession 
becomes illusory. Leibniz, who took up this option, struggled unsuccessfully with the problem of 
explaining the experience of succession and change on the assumption of the temporal 
indivisibility of the person. In the last analysis, he was forced to deny the reality of time, and to 
say that one’s future is not really future, that it is really present, although dimly perceived.12 In 
our own century, Russell and Whitehead, encouraged by the emerging quantum view of reality in 
physics, developed the second alternative, a serial view of reality which preserves temporal 
succession as nonillusory. Solipsism of the present moment may well be logically irrefutable. 
But the Russell-Whitehead option suggests that, instead of viewing this conclusion as the 
frustration of epistemological aspirations (e.g., to prove the existence of the eternal world), we 
ought to view it as the fulfillment of ontological aspirations. For if solipsism of the present 
moment is not logically irrefutable, then one’s present field of consciousness is an essentially 
independent actual entity. 
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(4) A field of consciousness is private. In other words, one person has no direct awareness of the 
contents of another’s field. In the last analysis, experience is not public. One is aware of 
another’s field only indirectly, whether by deliberate communication or unintended gesture. The 
very need for communication, in the sense of overt expression of one’s experience, strongly 
suggests the privacy of experience. One person does not always know what another is imagining 
or feeling until the other expresses himself overtly, and when the other finally expresses himself 
the first person is sometimes surprised. If we were directly aware of one another’s field, this 
surprise would be difficult to explain.  
Privacy does not mean that human experience is not social. On the contrary, what seems to 
distinguish a field of human consciousness is that different standpoints are in communication 
within it. It exhibits intra-personal, ego-alter ego dialogue.13 However, this socialization of the 
field does not mean that the field is literally public (i.e., open to direct acquaintance by different 
persons). All it implies is consciousness’ empathetic adoption of the standpoint of another 
private center of conscious activity.  
(5) A field of consciousness occupies a region of “physical space” (as contrasted with 
“phenomenal space”).14 This point is far from trivial. It goes counter to the entire Cartesian 
tradition, which insists that mind is unextended. Physiological theory seems to place the field of 
consciousness “in the brain.” For example, visual sensation does not occur with retinal 
stimulation, but rather with activity in the occipital lobe. What suggests this general view is that 
direct stimulation of the brain produces sensation without any peripheral stimulation, while 
peripheral stimulation is inadequate if neurons to the brain are severed. The sensory contents of 
one’s perceptual field are presumed to be caused by the action of afferent neural impulses, but an 
impulse, by moving through space, can cause a change of state in an actual entity, it seems, only 
if the entity on which it acts is also in space.  
However, the view that the mental field is in the brain has frequently raised the objection that it 
requires one to hold that his entire directly perceived world is inside his head, whereas it is a 
patent fact of experience that his head is really only one perceptual object alongside others. A 
way around this difficulty is to see the difference between one’s head 
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and one’s brain. The difference is as great as that between any object of direct perception and the 
unperceived theoretical entity postulated by natural science. One’s field of perception is located 
in his brain, but his head is one of the contents of that field. When one looks in the mirror, his 
head enters into his visual field, which is a content of his field of consciousness, which is located 
where his brain is, which is part of his physiological organism (in contrast to his lived body). No 
one directly perceives a brain or organism. The question is: are these systems of natural science 
merely theoretical constructs which aid in the prediction of phenomena, or do they really exist? 
This is the well-known controversy between scientific phenomenalism and scientific realism. 
Ewing writes the following in defense of the realist position: 
Practically not scientific or even merely common sense prediction about future perceptions can 
be made without introducing as an intermediary link between the prediction and the direct 
observations on which it is based the notion of a physical object existing unperceived…. We 
have thus in order to make predictions to assume at least that our experience will go on as if 
there were physical objects existing independently of us in the realist sense. This at least we must 
admit even if we say that independent physical objects are only methodological fictions. But this 
itself is a very strong argument for their really existing. That experience should persistently go 
on as if something were true is the strongest empirical argument we can have for its really being 
true.15  
If realism with respect to submicroscopic objects were not true, the predictable order of 
experience might be difficult to explain without recourse to divine intervention. It seems we 
would have on our hands what Smart calls a “cosmic accident.”16 But if we accept scientific 
realism, then we are committed to the view that there is a “physical space” besides the 
“phenomenal spaces” of our various fields of consciousnesses. What is directly perceived in the 
brain is partly caused by the motion of stimuli impinging on the organism from the outside. But 
motion implies space. This space cannot be the private perceptual space of one’s field of 
consciousness. It is the space in which unperceived brains, organisms, molecules, and various 
elementary particles coexist. And if one’s field of consciousness 
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is “in his brain,” it follows that our various fields, each with its private visual and tactual spaces, 
also coexist in this space. The changing contents of my perceptual space are causally explained 
by supposing that this perceptual space stands in changing spatial relations with other things in 
physical space. But the field of consciousness is not merely contained in this space. It occupies a 
definite region of this space. For if it is in this space, it cannot occupy a mere mathematical 
point, since then it would be an ideal entity and would not actually exist as a concrete individual. 
Just as nothing can actually exist in time if it is instantaneous and occupies no measurable 
duration whatsoever, so nothing can exist as an actual concrete individual in space if it is a mere 
point and occupies no measurable volume.  
Mind-brain-identity. It is perhaps unnecessary to go further in discussing the field of 
consciousness. Obviously much more could be said. But enough has already been done to pave 
the way for an explanation of the nonmaterialistic identity thesis which I wish to defend. The 
thesis may be understood as a solution to the problem of parallelism. Schlick advances us 
towards this solution by distinguishing between “three kinds of realms” which have persistently 
been confused:17 (1) what he calls “the realities themselves,” or, in a more openly Kantian vein, 
the “things in themselves”; (2) “the quantitative concepts of natural science” which are “applied 
to these realities,” and (3) the “intuitive images through which the quantities in (2) are 
represented to our consciousness.” For example, the electron may be imaged as a particle which 
is like perceptible bodies, except that as a matter of fact it is very much smaller. But it is clear 
that the electron, as a “reality” to which the quantitative concepts of physics apply, does not 
resemble this object of the physicist’s imagination. At most, the image functions as a concrete 
symbol, in the physicist’s field of consciousness, of the quantifiable reality, outside his field of 
consciousness, which causes certain objects of his perception (e.g., cloud chamber tracts). As 
Schlick says, “naturally (3), here, is a part of (1), that is, a subsidiary part of that part of reality 
which we call our consciousness.” The realities to which natural science concepts apply are 
“physical” just because these concepts apply to them. But physical concepts tell us nothing, it 
seems, about what Locke called the “real inner 
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essence”18 of the things in themselves. Such concepts are relational. For example, to say that an 
element possesses force is not to say anything about what it is in itself, but is simply to state its 
potential accelerating effect on other elements. And to say that an element has mass is simply to 
say that the force of another is required in order to alter the state of its motion. In other words, 
natural science concepts are “role” concepts. They define the causal role of the element with 
respect to other elements, but not the nature of the role-taker apart from the role.  
Interaction is an external relation between substantially independent elements. Natural science 
seeks to determine the laws of interaction, causal laws. It is silent about the internal properties of 
the substantial realities themselves. But the “things in themselves” must have some internal 
properties. The notion of something with external, relational (causal) properties, but with no 
internal properties, would be incoherent. In order for something to have accidental properties, it 
must have essential properties. It must be something. Thus there is something which the physicist 
cannot as a physicist know about the electron, and something which the physiologist as a 
physiologist cannot know about brain process. The physiologist’s brain process concepts are 
quantitative natural science concepts referring to a reality outside the physiologist’s field of 
consciousness, a reality which is the primary external cause of certain objects of his direct 
perception (e.g., encephalograph readings). This reality may be symbolized within his field by 
the “intuitive image” of a complex material system. But, just as in the case of the electron, there 
is not likely any qualitative resemblance between this image and the external cause or reality. 
The image is an essentially dependent content of the physiologist’s field, while the external 
reality, which acts as an efficient cause, is a substantial reality.19 What is the nature of that 
reality?  
The hypothesis which seems the most plausible is that the reality referred to by brain process 
concepts is, under normal waking conditions, the field of consciousness of the physiologist’s 
subject. We suppose that the underlying reality is substantial. The subject’s field of 
consciousness is substantial. The rule of parsimony bids us refrain from postulating, à la Kant, an 
“x” of unknown nature to be this reality, and simply to identify it with the subject’s conscious 
field, which, moreover, we assume 
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(under normal waking conditions) to exist at the same place in physical space. Two different 
things cannot simultaneously exist at one place. What a physiologist might know from the 
outside as my brain process, I intuit from the inside as my conscious field. What the physiologist 
might know indirectly and in its external causal relations with other things, I know directly and 
in itself.  
Feigl defends a nonmaterialistic identity thesis which is very close to the one presented here, as 
distinct from the materialistic thesis of Place and Smart. But the positions of Place, Smart, and 
Feigl all appear burdened with a highly misleading analogy. Feigl says that the mental is related 
to the physical (i.e., brain process) as table salt is related to NaCl.20 This is comparable to Place’s 
view that the mind-brain relation is analogous to that between lightning and electrical 
discharge.21 The concept of table salt is a phenomenal concept; that is, the table salt is white in 
color quality, characterized by a particular taste, and so forth; NaCl is its “scientific successor 
concept.”22 But the analogy to the mind-brain relation seems rather deceptive. Electrical 
discharge is the partial cause of lightning, which is a phenomenal object. Lightning is what one 
directly sees in the sky. It is not identical to electrical discharge, which, like the astronomer’s 
star, is never directly seen. In natural science, a cause is never identical with its effect. (If Place 
does not mean by “lightning” what can be directly seen, he seems to be using the term in a rather 
unordinary sense, which he should make clear.) Moreover, the electrical discharge is only the 
partial cause of the perceived lightning, since certain causal conditions are physiological. Finally, 
the perceived lightning and electrical discharge are differently located in physical space. Because 
the discharge is only a partial cause; there is no possibility of a parallelism or one-to-one 
correspondence of lightning events to discharge events. If there had been no organisms, 
presumably there might still have been discharges, but there would have been no lightning. But 
the identity theory assumes that there are certain types of brain events which are never 
unaccompanied by mental states. Thus the relation of the field of consciousness to brain process 
is quite different from the relation of lightning to electrical discharge, or table salt to NaCl. 
Indeed, the suggested analogy 
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seems contradictory. Table salt, as a thing perceived, would have to be identical both to a 
particular brain state and to NaCl.  
Panpsychism. If the nonmaterialistic brain-mind identity thesis is adopted, the physiological 
organism appears as a system, hierarchically organized, of substantial, interacting elements, one 
of which is a human field of consciousness. The question then arises: what is the internal nature 
of the other elements? The speculative hypothesis to which Whitehead and others take recourse 
is that they are also psychic. To use Bradley’s terminology, they are felt wholes. Whitehead uses 
the metaphor “drops” of experience.23 It must be admitted that this metaphysical hypothesis does 
not seem to be testable in any exact scientific sense. Few, however, will want to say that it is 
cognitively meaningless, since it is only because we understand its meaning that we know that it 
is untestable, that in conjunction with known facts it does not seem to permit prediction of any 
directly verifiable statements. Under the circumstances, what sort of specifically metaphysical 
argument might be advanced?  
The argument which seems to me the most promising would be developed along the following 
lines.24 We assume that the elements of the physiological system are substantial because they 
causally interact. (To act as a cause is to act as an indivisible and independent unit of actual 
existence.) Since Descartes, two types of substance have been in contention: material and 
spiritual. “Material body,” we have noted, is ambiguous. In the sense of the phrase where we are 
directly aware of such bodies, they cannot be substantial entities because they are internally 
related to one another and to mental acts of judgment. The only type of substance of which we 
are directly aware is the nonmaterial type: the field of consciousness. Either substantial entities 
other than the human field of consciousness are of some unknown type, or they, like the 
conscious field which each of us may intuit as his own, are of the psychic type. Although it is 
possible that there is some unknown type of substance which is neither material nor psychic (as 
in, for example, the double aspect theory), it seems more probable that there is not. Since we are 
directly acquainted with a substantial entity of the psychic type, the more conservative 
hypothesis would seem to be that the physiological 
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organism is a system of “atomic spirits,” one of which, at the top of the hierarchy, is the human 
field of consciousness. Once again, application of Occam’s razor suggests that we refrain from 
postulating substances of some unknown type, unless logical and/or factual reasons induce us to 
do so. I know of no such reasons, and thus conclude, tentatively, that panpsychism is more 
probably true than false.  
Feigl objects to the panpsychist extension of the identity thesis on the grounds that panpsychism 
is refuted by the very argument from analogy to which panpsychists appeal.25 They say that as a 
particular sort of brain process is to the human field of consciousness, so every physical element 
is related to its underlying or intrinsic reality. But brain process is the most complex physical 
process known to man. Accordingly, reasoning analogically, we should say that the human field 
of consciousness is radically different from the intrinsic nature of inanimate physical elements 
(e.g., an electron).  
In reply it may be said that if the brain and inanimate physical elements, despite the wide 
dissimilarity in degree of organization, are “physical” in a single sense of the term, then both the 
human field of consciousness and the underlying reality of the electron may be “psychic” in a 
single generalized sense of the term. But a problem immediately arises. We have a generalized 
notion of the physical only, it seems, because we know of physical entities at both ends of a 
continuum of increasing levels and degrees of organization. We know of both electrons and 
brains, and from such divergent cases we can form a concept of the physical, of what they share 
in common. But in the case of the psychic, we are acquainted with only one end of the alleged 
continuum. On the basis of our direct acquaintance with the human field of consciousness, can 
we generalize to a concept of the “psychic” broad enough to encompass the alleged intrinsic 
reality of the electron?  
Hartshorne writes that “we can generalize beyond human experience only by generalizing 
‘experience’ beyond its human variety.”26 Perhaps the experiential field of an isolated electron 
can be conceived on the basis of the human field by a process of abstraction or elimination. We 
may grant that it would not be possible to form a concept of a human field on the basis of a 
subhuman field. But just as the adult has at least the possibility of understanding something of 
the child’s mental life (whereas the 
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child has no possibility of understanding the adult) so we may be able to conceptualize the nature 
of experiential wholes simpler than even the child’s. Of course, the difficulty is magnified here 
by the fact that the adult remembers being a child, but not an electron.  
In attempting to conceive the inner existence of an isolated electron, one of the characteristics of 
a human field which would surely have to be eliminated is its differentiation into different 
sensory modes, such as color and touch. Yet if we are going to speak of the electron as at all 
“psychic,” we must at least attribute some form of sentience to it. The electron would thus 
exercise a form of primitive feeling undifferentiated with respect to sensory modes. Such 
differentiation appears empirically impossible apart from an organism in which various sense 
organs (and corresponding brain centers) are structurally differentiated. According to the 
Whiteheadian view, a psychic entity is, most generally, the act of feeling an environment. Since 
the environment consists, for Whitehead, in similar acts, it is a feeling of feelings. It contains, 
then, at the very least, an act-object structure, a distinction between the act of feeling and what is 
directly felt. Both aspects are simultaneous, so that neither is causally prior. They are internally 
related aspects of a single felt whole. In its most primitive form, a mind would be without 
differentiation into sensory modes. It would be neither recollective nor anticipatory, and it would 
be capable of neither imagination nor abstract conception. Moreover, insofar as perception 
presupposes both concept formation and imagination, the most primitive form of psyche would 
not exhibit perceptual consciousness. And, lacking perception, it would lack a focus-fringe 
structure. Finally, it of course would not be self-conscious, and would not be capable of 
intelligent communication with other minds. It would be mind reduced to the bare fact of 
sentience. (The possibility of nonmodal sentience is suggested empirically by coenesthesia.)  
To say that the physiological organism is a system of atomic spirits seems to conflict with the 
view that the organism is a physical system. But there is really no conflict. The term “physical” 
is used here to designate anything to which the quantitative concepts of natural science apply. 
(The ambiguity of “physical” may again be recalled. In the usage presently being invoked, the 
typewriter directly before me is not physical, as is a molecular system which no one perceives 
directly.) When we conceive the causal interactions between elements of a system ignoring the 
internal nature of each element, we have the concept of a physical system. When we conceive the 
possible interactions of an indivisible element with other 
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elements, ignoring the internal properties of that element, we have a concept of an elementary 
physical particle. But when we conceive the internal nature of an element, ignoring its causal 
relations (expressible in mathematical formulae) with other elements, then we form a concept of 
a nonmaterial substance, a spirit or “felt whole.” The elements are physical in their external, 
causal relations, but nonphysical in their internal properties. The organism appears as a physical 
system of psychic elements.  
The mind-matter thesis suggested here is of course a version of the “identity thesis.” But it is not 
a materialistic identity thesis. If we find, as I think we must, that it is impossible to deny the 
instantiation of psychic attributes (e.g., color qualities, feeling qualities, the qualities of mental 
acts such as being perceptual or conceptual), then any materialism which claims that nothing can 
have such attributes seems ruled out. And if materialism is the view that all substantial realities 
are physical, then the existence of fields of consciousness suffices to refute materialism. But one 
might suppose that idealism is equally ruled out. For if a brain event (of a particular sort) is 
identical with a field of consciousness, then it is equally true that the field of consciousness is 
identical with a brain event. Since the field of consciousness exists, materialism seems clearly 
false, since matter is conceived so as to exclude certain properties (e.g., subjective sense 
qualities) found in the field of consciousness. But if the field of consciousness is brain process, 
then it is also true that no nonphysical substances exist. And if idealism asserts that no 
substances are physical, then idealism is just as false as materialism. For the only candidates for 
nonphysical substances, namely the fields of sentience, are, by the identity thesis, after all 
physical. And the only candidates for physical substances, namely the elements of the world of 
natural science, are, by the pan-psychist extension of the identity thesis, all of them physical. 
Thus we get the result both that all substances are physical and that all are psychical. Now it 
seems that both materialism and idealism are true. How, then, have they come to be viewed as 
incompatible? But since materialism says there are no psychical substances, and since idealism 
says there are no physical substances, we also get the result that materialism and idealism are 
both false.  
What we should perhaps say is that they are both true in what they affirm, and false in what they 
deny. Materialism may be true in saying that all substances are material, but false in saying that 
none is psychical. Idealism may be true in saying that all substances are psychical, false in 
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saying that none is material. The error then comes from thinking that a material substance cannot 
be psychical, and that a psychical substance cannot be material. Actually, all substances may be 
both psychical and material.  
Are we saying, then, that materialism and idealism stand on an equal footing, that neither 
enlightens us as to the nature of substances more than the other? In the last analysis, the scale 
seems tipped in favor of idealism by the reflection that materialism insists that all substances are 
essentially material. According to the thesis suggested here, substances are both material and 
psychical, but whereas they are essentially psychical, they are only accidentally material. They 
are psychical in their intrinsic natures. They are material only in their external, causal relations 
with one another. And this is why the present identity thesis is nonmaterialistic. Brain process is 
essentially psychic, while the field of consciousness is accidentally brain process. One might say 
that materialism is a contingent truth, while idealism is an essential truth.  
There does not seem to be any logical contradiction in the supposition of only one substantial 
entity, and in a monistic universe such as this there would be no interaction, and thus no matter. 
But this substance would still, according to the view being outlined, consist in a field of 
consciousness. A substance is material only insofar as it causally conditions or limits another 
substance. It is material for another; in itself it is psychical.  
There is no reason to hide the problems which any full defense of the present view would entail. 
Chief among these problems is that of reconciling the view, derived from physics, that the 
ultimate units of reality are subatomic, with the phenomenologically based view that the field of 
consciousness is an indivisible unit and the view, based on physiological psychology, that the 
physiological correlate of the field of consciousness consists in an enormous mass of elementary 
physical particles. The problem is obvious once we say that the relation between the field of 
consciousness and its physiological correlate is one of identity. One solution to this difficulty is 
suggested by the Hartshorne-Whiteheadian concept of a “compound individual.”27 The 
physiological correlate may 
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not be merely a mass of particles; it is the most highly organized such mass which we know. 
There may be a certain threshold degree of organization at which a collection of externally 
related elements fuses into an indivisible unit of inseparable moments, a “high-level substance.”  
Purdue University, 
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